Information, Justice and Public Support for Carbon Tax-and-Divided Policies: Experimental Evidence from Germany

Abstract

Carbon pricing can deliver large emissions reductions, but public opposition remains a key barrier. We study how support for carbon tax-and-transfer schemes depends on policy design and information provision in a large-scale survey experiment with German respondents. Explaining the policy mechanism robustly increases support across price levels. Information on distributional consequences raises support only when revenue recycling is sufficiently generous, and can secure majority approval even at high carbon prices. Individualized cost information increases support among those who overestimated costs, with no backlash for under-estimators when redistribution is high. These effects operate through distinct fairness channels: information shapes both self- and other-regarding justice perceptions, and while self-interest predicts support, other-regarding concerns — particularly for the poor — are an independent driver of policy acceptance. Our findings suggest that political feasibility hinges not only on policy design, but on making the mechanism understood and its distributional implications visible.